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MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND MARITAL SUPREMACY
SERENE MAYERI

Katherine Franke’s Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality is the
culmination of almost two decades of trenchant scholarship challenging the
primacy of marriage in LGBT advocacy and in American law and society. Since
the late 1990s, Franke has mined the history of African Americans’ postbellum
encounters with marriage for cautionary tales about the hazards of legal
recognition. In both contexts, Franke argues, winning marriage rights risks
exposed individuals and families to invasive regulation, stifling sexual freedom
and experimentation, suppressing alternative arrangements for the provision of
care and support, and demeaning those who cannot or do not wish to marry.1
The parallel between Reconstruction-era freedpeople and twenty-first century
gay and lesbian Americans, as Franke is careful to acknowledge, is imperfect; it
is discontinuity as much as similarity that makes the analogy fruitful. Most
strikingly, the juxtaposition of these two cases spotlights how marriage equality
advocates have succeeded, with astonishing alacrity, in normalizing what was
once unthinkable. Franke argues that the marriage equality movement achieved
this feat in part by inadvertently mobilizing the very ideological tropes and
material realities that have rendered marriage at best an elusive ideal and at worst
a rationale for the oppression and marginalization of African Americans.
Why have these encounters with marriage diverged so profoundly, defying
Franke’s earlier concern that gay marriage rights might aggravate rather than
ameliorate homophobia? During Reconstruction, recognizing freedpeople as
equal citizens with full ownership of their bodies and labor, with legal rights to
marry and form families without interference from white overlords, posed a
profound threat to the very foundation of white Southern society, labor relations,
and political economy. Put simply, powerful white Southerners had everything
to lose from recognizing the rights of freedpeople. The horrific backlash against
marriage rights was part of a larger violent repression that squelched the promise
of emancipation and largely reinstated a system that exploited African
Americans’ labor under conditions of excruciating unfreedom.
Today, most white Americans probably do not see basic legal rights for
African Americans as a profound threat to their own status and well-being. (And
indeed formal legal equality has proven to be a less-than-powerful weapon
against entrenched racial privilege and injustice). Yet, as Franke describes,
African Americans are perceived as, and blamed for, deviating from the
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normative ideal of family life. Specifically, bearing and raising children outside
of marriage threatens a system that privatizes dependency in the nuclear family.
Promoters of marriage as a solution to poverty seek to avoid the larger public
outlays required to provide financial and/or caregiving support to single parents.
In contrast, equal rights for gay and lesbian couples appear to pose little
material threat, real or perceived, to the political economy of marriage in the
United States. While some straight Americans see in same-sex marriage an
existential threat, marriage equality for gay and lesbian couples—and even
enforceable laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity more broadly—would not fundamentally alter the regional or national
balance of social, political, and economic power. And (as Franke notes), at least
some public officials perceive gay and lesbian (adoptive) parents as offering a
“solution” to the “problem” of unplanned pregnancy, a problem which gay and
lesbian parents themselves are assumed not to experience.2 In other words, one
explanation for the relative impotence of the anti-marriage equality backlash
might be that same-sex marriage (and nondiscrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity) does not appear to threaten entrenched power
structures or pocketbooks.
Franke’s transhistorical comparison also invites us to consider how the social
meaning and material reality of marriage has changed in the century and a half
between Reconstruction and the triumph of marriage equality. Since formerly
enslaved persons gained access to the institution in the nineteenth century,
marriage has undergone several intertwined and overlapping transformations.
Relevant changes concern, for instance: the internal architecture of marriage
(private inter se rights and obligations of spouses to each other); the relationship
between marriage and the state (the public benefits and duties conferred by the
government on marital families); the boundaries between marriage and
nonmarriage (how the laws of marriage and marital status affect the
nonmarried); the social norms and practices surrounding marriage and
nonmarriage (including demographic shifts in who marries, divorces, cohabits,
gives birth, performs parenting functions); and of course the larger political,
economic, and social context.
The nineteenth-century marital bargain retained much of the formal structure
of coverture, with husbands and wives expected to perform distinct reciprocal
roles. Wives owed husbands personal services including maintaining a home,
caring for children and other dependents, and sexual access. In exchange,
husbands bore primary responsibility for the family’s financial support. By the
middle of the twentieth century, the marital bargain acquired a greater public
component. For many women, marriage to a male breadwinner became the
primary gateway to benefits such as Social Security and health insurance.3
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“Deserving” widows, abandoned mothers, and their children could receive
public assistance through mothers’ pensions and later Aid to (Families with)
Dependent Children. But social insurance remained out of reach for the many
African American women and men who worked in domestic and agricultural
occupations.4 De jure and de facto segregation in education, housing, and
employment limited access to desirable jobs and neighborhoods. As black
women and children gained access to welfare benefits, they became increasingly
stingy and stigmatized.5 Many African Americans, in short, never enjoyed the
benefits of the old gender-based marital bargain.
A second transformation of marriage has occurred in the years since the 1965
Moynihan Report crystalized the political linkage of family structure and
poverty. Feminists—led by African American advocates such as Pauli Murray
and Eleanor Holmes Norton—promoted an egalitarian vision of marriage in
which men and women shared breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities.
This egalitarian vision underwrote Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 1970s litigation
campaign, which turned husbands and wives into interchangeable spouses as a
matter of formal law. By the end of the 1970s, marriage had become essentially
gender-neutral as a matter of constitutional law: the government could no longer
award benefits based on stereotypical assumptions of wives’ dependence upon
breadwinning husbands. Under the new marital bargain, educated professional
women gained the opportunity—in theory, at least—to forge equal partnerships
with men. Increasingly, however, marriage—egalitarian or otherwise—
remained out of reach for many low-income women and women of color. Rates
of divorce and nonmarital childbearing soared. Just as feminists renegotiated the
marital bargain, marriage itself became a status of the privileged.6
Notwithstanding these profound changes, marriage’s legal supremacy
endured. Constitutional challenges succeeded in removing many of the formal
legal disabilities endured by nonmarital children, but the government remained
free to privilege and promote marriage at the expense of nonmarital families.7
As the marriage equality movement exposed and emphasized, by the turn of the
twenty-first century myriad federal and state laws conferred rights and
obligations on the basis of marital status. And for all of the ways that twentyfirst century marriage might be unrecognizable to a nineteenth-century
American, certain constants remain. Marriage continues to be a primary means
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of managing dependency in the absence of a robust welfare state. The more
marriage correlates with socioeconomic status, the more the material and
dignitary benefits of marriage accrue to those who need them least, exacerbating
a vicious cycle of inequality.
This interim history can help shed light on the questions motivating Franke’s
study of marriage equality’s perils, and the conclusions we might draw from her
book. Chapter 6 asks, provocatively, is marriage “for straight people?”8 Franke
suggests that marriage may be a poor fit for individuals and couples who wish
to depart from traditional heteronormative gender roles.9 Arguably, though,
marriage today is working best for couples who conform to the ideal of shared
breadwinning and caregiving pioneered by African American feminists; many
spouses who specialize in caregiving still find themselves disadvantaged at
divorce. If this is true, then to the extent that married same-sex couples are more
likely to have egalitarian relationships, divorce laws that assume equal
contributions to the accumulation of marital property and limit long-term
spousal support may be a reasonably good fit (or at least no worse than for
different-sex couples). Same-sex couples (like different-sex couples) who wish
to keep their property separate, and limit post-dissolution obligations, can opt
out through premarital agreements.
The disciplining effect of marriage seems potentially more troubling, but
there is another side to this story, too. As Mary Anne Case has written, marriage
today may paradoxically confer greater “license” for couples to structure their
relationships, including their sexual lives, as they choose without interference
from the state.10 And as feminist and family law scholars have long observed, it
is nonmarital, dissolving, and impoverished families who experience intrusions
into family life that marital privacy would never countenance.
Marriage, in other words, may be a good fit for gay and lesbian couples who
look and act like the subset of privileged straight couples for whom marriage is
working best. But regardless of one’s predictions about how marriage will affect
and be affected by the same-sex couples who choose to marry, the threat to the
non-married (gay and straight) that Franke identifies seems undeniable. That
threat, I would suggest, is posed not so much by marriage equality as by marriage
supremacy—the legal and social privileging of marriage and marital families.
So long as public and private benefits such as social insurance and health care
are tied to marriage (or to conjugal partnership) and inaccessible to the
nonmarried and unpartnered, marriage will continue to be an engine of
inequality. So long as parental rights and obligations depend upon marital status,
nonmarital parents and children will suffer disadvantage. So long as marriage is
considered the gold standard of relationships, alternatives to marriage (and to
conjugal partnership) languish, stifling and marginalizing not only marriage
dissenters but those for whom marriage is desired but inaccessible.
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The history of challenges to the legal primacy of marriage is a tale both
cautionary and inspiring for those who share Franke’s vision of a world in which
marriage ceases to be central to social and economic citizenship. At the same
time that feminists succeeded in making the laws of marriage and divorce
formally gender-neutral, another, lesser-known, and less successful strand of
feminism attacked laws that penalized unmarried women and their families.
African Americans often led the way in these challenges to laws that excluded
women with nonmarital children from employment and housing, denied them
government benefits, forced mothers to identify their children’s father, and
discriminated against “illegitimate” children in matters of support, inheritance,
government benefits, and the like. The campaign against illegitimacy penalties
was most successful when it could frame innocent children as the primary
victims of policies meant to deter adults’ illicit sexual relationships, and when
eliminating discrimination furthered the privatization of dependency. It was far
less successful in persuading courts to question the supremacy of marriage, to
endorse unfettered sexual and reproductive liberty, or to see discrimination
based on marital status as unjustly perpetuating racial, sexual, and economic
inequality.11
Wedlocked closes with a “Progressive Call to Action for Married Queers” in
which Franke exhorts newly rights-bearing spouses to support alternatives to
marriage; to resist the denigration of nonmarital relationships, sexuality, and
reproduction; and to fight for other progressive causes such as racial and
economic justice and reproductive rights.12 Whether same-sex marriage marks
the latest chapter in the history of marital supremacy or the first step toward
achieving a broader vision of equality depends on all of us—married, queer, or
neither—to heed her call.
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